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Abstract
This paper critically examines the multiple rationales for telecom, IT, media (ICT)
convergence regulation on the one hand, and multisector utility regulation on the other, and
the practical questions of implementation they pose, with a view to contributing to informed
policy and regulatory decisions that are now underway in many countries. The conditions that
may affect the creation of convergence and multi-sector regulation, ranging from underlying
commonality of inputs and the behaviour of regulated firms to considerations that are specific
to the regulatory process such as scarcity of regulatory resources and safeguards for
regulatory independence, are examined. The paper concludes that ICT and media
convergence issues are primarily about improving the efficiency of market economies, and
how changes in regulation can facilitate this process. It is likely to be of primary interest for
countries that already have an established effective independent telecom regulator.
Multisector regulation issues are primarily about establishing the efficiency and effectiveness
of regulation so it can be a catalyst for network and economic development. It is likely to be of
primary interest to countries that have not yet established effective telecom regulation. Each
regulatory option arises from an initial diagnose of different problems, and represents different
priorities and pathways to achieving a very similar set of development objectives.
Introduction
In a dynamic period of technological and market change in the ICT sector, telecom regulation
must also be dynamic and responsive to changing conditions. As a result, many countries are
considering various options for the next step in telecom regulation. This paper critically
examines the multiple rationales for information and communication technology (ICT) and
media convergence regulation and multi-sector utility regulation, and the practical questions
of implementation that they pose, with a view to contributing to informed policy choices. Both
options involve substantive as well as procedural issues, not necessarily separable. Policy
design is affected by overall policy objectives, not necessarily limited to extant and accepted
objectives such as increasing investment in a particular infrastructure sector. The design may
be driven by explicit objectives such as enhancing a country’s comparative advantage with
regard to advanced service industries or implicit objectives such as minimizing the political or
perceptual fallout of a change in regulatory regime or personnel. In the paper, the conditions
that may affect the creation of convergence and multi-sector regulation, ranging from
underlying commonality of inputs and the behaviour of regulated firms to considerations that
are specific to the regulatory process such as scarcity of regulatory resources and safeguards
for regulatory independence are examined.
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Definitions of Industry, Sector and Multi-sector
An industry is defined in terms of substitution possibilities in consumption. 2 Conceptually,
complete substitutability would be the test of an industry. In reality, a high degree of
substitutability defines an industry. For purposes of regulation, it is more common to define
the scope of regulatory agencies in terms of ‘sectors’, rather than single industries. A sector is
a set of closely related industries, which have a degree of substitution possibilities or
substantial economies of scope on the supply or demand sides. The higher the substitution
possibilities, the more likely is it that the term “industry” will be used over “sector”. As
consumption or production conditions change, the definitions of industries and sectors will
change. By definition, therefore, multi-sector regulation must involve industries/sectors that do
not have significant substitutability or substantial complementarity.
The Convergence Perspective: ICT and Media Convergence/Divergence
The broad range of industries involved in ICT and media convergence is IT, telecom,
broadcasting and other media dealing with information and entertainment.  Figure 2 illustrates
the industries involved and the levels of activities from equipment/hardware and
transport/software to content/service provision. Each of the different industries can be
conceived as encompassing all three levels although they are not entirely comparable.
However, Figure 2 illustrates that there are many possibilities for convergence at a horizontal
level between different industries as well as vertical integration between different levels. It
also illustrates that divergence and disintegration are possible. Industries that formerly have
witnessed (some degree of) vertical integration may experience new lines of divisions of
labour between different actors in the field. Convergence / integration and divergences /
disintegration go hand in hand.
Figure 2: Convergence/integration and divergence/disintegration
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Technology Neutrality
There is thus both a horizontal and vertical aspect, and both aspects are subject to discussion
in the paper. The horizontal level has hitherto been primarily concerned with convergence at
the equipment / hardware and transport / software levels (in communications called
infrastructure and associated services, in the terminology of the European Union3). Often
countries have dealt differently - in terms of, for instance, licensing procedures and
interconnection rules - with fixed telecom networks, mobile networks, and cable and terrestrial
broadcast networks. At present, there is, however, a general shift in the rules and procedures
in many countries towards an equal treatment (convergence) of different information and
communication infrastructures. The EU is a case in point with its emphasis on technology
neutral regulation. 4
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Content Issues
The horizontal level also includes the possible implications of convergence at the content
layer. Types of content that, formerly, were dedicated for specific industries can be conveyed
on different infrastructures because of the common digital form. This presents new
possibilities for end users and new market potentials for producers, but it also presents
regulatory problems that have to be solved. One of the problems is related to the provisions
for public service in the broadcast area.  Should such provisions be extended to the Internet
web, or should convergence on the content level lead to an abolition of public service rules?
Another issue relates to the extended access to different kinds of illegal or harmful
information, for instance racist propaganda, which the Internet facilitates. What are the
possibilities of countries to retain control of this?  Yet another problem is related to the
provisions for media responsibility that exist today for print and broadcast media but do not
apply to Internet.
 Infrastructure and Content Together?
There is also a vertical aspect – not only in the sense that there are numerous examples of
industries integrating or trying to integrate equipment and transport and content provision, but
also in the sense that some countries integrate infrastructure regulation and content
regulation. India is an example of this. The new Communications Commission of India (CCI),
the Indian communications regulator, will integrate infrastructure and content regulation in one
institution5. The UK is another example, in which the government is uniting five existing
regulatory bodies dealing with communications into one regulator, OFCOM, with authority in
both infrastructural and content questions 6. Singapore and Malaysia are also examples of
countries that have assembled the regulation of infrastructure and content. The InfoComm
Development Authority of Singapore left the regulation of all forms of content to the Singapore
Broadcast but it is envisaged that this too will be merged shortly.7
In the case of horizontal convergence, it is a matter of converging regulation and possibly
converging regulators. In the case of vertical integration, it is mostly a matter of integrated
regulators, as infrastructure and content regulation are two rather different fields, although
integration of content and infrastructure provision may have implications not only for the
industrial structure but also for the content itself. The EU, for instance, draws a sharp line
between infrastructure (and associated services) and content. It is, however, a question
whether this is possible without leaving aside important issues.
Convergence involves technological, market and policy/regulation dimensions.The main issue
in the convergence discussion is, therefore, concerned with the possibilities for exploiting the
industrial opportunities in creating a new dynamic ICT sector encompassing hitherto separate
sectors.8 Apart from the broad diffusion and use of the new media and communication
(universal access) and the protection of consumers in new media markets, this is the overall
issue for convergence policy: to establish a framework for the growth of a dynamic
communication and information industry. It is in this perspective that most convergence
policies are seen.
Convergence Technology Trends
This section provides a overview of the major technological aspects of the ICT and media
convergence processes. The focus is on the role of technological changes and developments
in the creation of new conditions for production, aggregation, delivery and consumption of
communication services.
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The major technological changes that have facilitated the convergence processes are
digitalisation and computerization. Digitalisation enables new possibilities for development
and creation of services within and beyond the framework of traditional communication
sectors. It is, for example, likely that services that go beyond the traditional broadcasting
services, like Internet services, will have a certain weight on the broadcasting market in the
future, as demand for these services is increasing with the penetration of the Internet. When
transmission capacity for end-user sites reaches that needed for transmission of video
services, the Internet can be one of the platforms for interactive TV services.
Emerging new infrastructures with more capacity, developments in the traditional networks
enabling them to offer more capacity to end users, and developments in compression and
coding technologies resulting in less bandwidth requirements for audio and video services all
have diminished the technically based limitations for different networks to provide an
increasing variety of different types of services. But there is still a long way to go before
network capacity constraints are substantially eliminated.
The following analysis is structured around the value chain of communication networks
depicted in Figure 3, so that different subsections deal with the technological aspects of
convergence in different parts of the value chain.
Figure 3: Convergence in the value chain
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The analysis aims at illustrating the technological drivers, but also barriers, for the
convergence processes in different parts of the value chain.
None of the infrastructures available can integrate all the services in their current state. While
integration of the back-bone parts of the networks have had better conditions to evolve,
integration of the last mile coverage has shown to be dependent on many different
parameters. However, some infrastructures have better potential to be upgraded to integrate
more types services. Cable TV networks are examples of this. On cable networks, it is
possible to offer several broadcasting services of acceptable quality and at the same time
deliver Internet and basic communication services. Also new LAN types of networks in
residential areas (and different wireless solutions on the market) can provide acceptable
performances. However, when upgrading cable TV networks and establishing new networks,
huge costs must be paid in one way or another.
There are, therefore, choice to be made between an integration model and a heterogeneous
model. This choice depends partly on the characteristics of the types of communication in
question and the characteristics of different kinds of networks and partly on the history of
network developments in the different countries. There is a certain path dependency in the
possible choices countries make, hinging on the former history of network development.
While in developed markets, the convergence process (both in integrated and heterogeneous
network versions) mainly facilitates a platform where the same service is delivered through
different infrastructure, for developing countries it mainly facilitates increased penetration of
services. In developed countries, convergence facilitates more competition, in developing
markets it is more likely to facilitate complementarity.
For example, cable TV networks can be used to offer telephony and Internet services.
However this possibility of reuse of infrastructure is only possible if a regulatory framework is
established that facilitates the efficient utilization of available resources in different networks.
This is often not the case.
Another important aspect concerns geographical regions where communication infrastructure
is not available. This gives more freedom in the design of the future networks, because the
demand for other services than telephony can be taken into account from the beginning, if
policy and regulation permit it.
· Convergence in content production is related primarily to service convergence
· Convergence in distribution is related to network convergence
· Convergence in equipment production is related to terminal convergence.
This does not imply that the different platforms will be used for provision of the same services
- a certain specialization is likely to remain. But the former boundaries between IT, telecom,
broadcasting and other mass media companies are going to be redefined and less visible.
An important barrier to the development of cross-sectional content providers is that it is not
enough to provide the same content on different platforms. In order to remain competitive,
content must be designed in a way that takes the potentials and limitations of each platform
into consideration. As long as the technical capabilities vary across platforms and networks,
there will always be a scope for development of content designed for a particular platform.
Not all of these attempts have been successful. TDC, formally TeleDanmark, had to realize
that broadcast and telecom are two quite different types of businesses and their TV channel
was closed down due to lack of subscribers. It has also been questioned whether the strategy
of Bell Canada Enterprises has paid off in terms of generation of revenues 9.
Summary of market trends
Convergence is shaping the present development of the ICT and media industries in ways
that challenge the existing institutional set-up. The market trends can be describes as follows:
· Company and market structures are formed by other factors than convergence such
as financial considerations and corporate strategies (conglomeration vs. focus on
core competencies).
· A large number of mergers and alliances have been made. Most of these mergers
and alliances have taken place between actors within the same market segment, and
may rather be attributed to internationalisation than to convergence. Still, a number of
cross-sectional and vertical mergers have taken place.
· Vertical integration has mainly taken place between content production and
distribution. At the same time there has been a trend towards disintegration of service
production and manufacturing particularly in the telecom sector. It is possible that a
further disintegration in the telecom sector will take place through a separation of
network provision and telecom service provision.
· Many companies have set up new activities in other sectors in order to complement
their core business. Content providers such as newspapers and broadcasters are
becoming multi-channel content providers, although they keep their main activities
within one sector. Telecom companies are going into content provision (including
broadcast) in order to ensure content to their networks.
· Convergence takes different forms in the different layers of the value chain.
Convergence in content production includes all of the four sectors, while convergence
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in distribution is most prominent between telecom and broadcasting sectors. In
equipment production it is the IT and telecom sectors that are converging (Figure 3).
· New ICT and media sectors are emerging. These sectors may in a certain phase be
dominated by companies from other sectors but can develop to sectors that in spite of
a deep integration with services from other sector may become dominated by
independent companies. The most obvious candidate is the mobile industry. In spite
of a considerable overlap between the markets for fixed and wireless services,
operators tend to separate their mobile operations into independent activities, which
later may be spun off as new independent companies.
Convergence Policy Issues
From a policy and regulatory point of view, convergence in the ICT and media areas raises a
number of issues. There are issues that are related to all three levels (equipment/hardware,
transport/software and content/services) in the convergence model (Figure 2). The ones that
will be dealt with here take up the issues of the general societal importance of convergence
policies, the balance between benefiting from industrial complementarities and the problems
of media concentration, and access to networks and content. Other issues are related to the
infrastructural levels (equipment/hardware and transport/software), where the overall question
is to what extent it is possible to subject all infrastructures to the same regulation. At the
content level, there are a large number of issues that have to be resolved, including the
question of whether all content areas can be treated in similar ways regarding, for instance,
what it means for public service provisions in the broadcast area and what it means for media
responsibility rules.10 Other questions deal with privacy protection, security, consumer
protection, intellectual property rights, and illegal information. 11 Finally, there is the issue of
the possibilities and problems regarding the separation of regulation of infrastructure and
content.
There is today a political trend towards loosening the restrictions on media concentration,
including cross media ownership provisions, in order to take advantage of complementarities
between media and technology areas.
But with the convergence between these networks and the possibilities for conveying similar
services over different networks, the foundation for differences in rules are beginning to be
questioned.
Similarly, it is an open issue to what extent regulation in the different content areas should
converge.
All these issues have existed for many years. They have not been created by the
development of convergence in the media and Internet areas. However, convergence and the
Internet create a new environment in which these known issues acquire new dimensions.
Parts of the issues and the regulatory rules that they give rise to are, therefore, connected
with the issue of media convergence, and rules taking account of this should be developed.
However, this does not necessarily mean that these issues should be part of a united
convergence regulation or that a single regulatory authority should deal them with.
To the extent that convergence between telecom, IT and broadcasting takes place
technologically and in the market place, or to the extent that it is a political aim to promote
such convergence tendencies, regulations of hitherto separate communication areas must
also converge – or regulations must at least adapt to or accommodate a new convergence
environment. Even though convergence developments have been known for many years, the
main thrust in recent research on convergence has been that the degree and character of
convergence developments are different today because of; (1)technology developments, first
and foremost the digitalisation processes; and (2) the political liberalization, including more
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liberal policies in relation to market convergences12. There is, consequently, an increasing
necessity of a closer relationship in the regulation of the different communication and media
areas. It is not sufficient to have the different areas under the same roof. The synergies
between the different regulatory areas must be developed more proactively, encompassing
the regulatory ‘contributions’ of the different areas. Telecom contributes with infrastructure
regulation and access issues; broadcasting with access and content issues; IT contributes
with, e.g., privacy and security issues; and together the different areas contribute with new
regulatory issues such as IPR (Intellectual Property Right) and e-commerce regulation.
The potential advantages would seem to be the following:
· To the extent that markets are converging, it is better to apply the same provisions
across communication and media areas.
· In regulatory interventions, it is important to be able to build on a greater knowledge
of corporations with activities in different communication and media areas and to
understand the inter-relationships between areas.
· To take advantage of the economies of scope and scale, especially the economies of
scope in the sense that some of the regulatory issues are the same across industry
platforms, for example in the case of price cap regulation. This is important in any
country trying to economise on the costs of regulation, but can be essential for
countries with insufficient suitably trained staff for the different regulatory
assignments.
· Possibilities for a greater political independence in relation to implementing policy
decisions, with administrative relationships to more than one ministry.
· One-stop-shopping for users of the regulatory institutions, as complaints and
applications only have to be filed with one organization.
The potential problems would seem to be the following:
· Unclear regulatory principles because of the unification of different regulatory
rationales, for instance, the unification of the infrastructure regulation tradition from
telecom and the content regulation tradition from broadcasting.
· More bureaucratic working procedures with the enlargement of the regulatory
organizations.
· Danger of less scope for independent implementation of policies as more than one
ministry will seek to influence regulatory decisions and procedures (in contrast to the
above-mentioned possibilities for greater independence).
· Opaque structure for the users of regulatory organizations, as they may not be able to
‘see through’ the organizational maze in unified organizations (in contrast to the
positive side of one-stop-shopping mentioned above).
From the advantages and problems described it seems clear that it cannot be determined in
advance whether the primary overall outcome of an organizational unification will be positive
or negative. It depends very much on the specific circumstances and the ways in which the
unified organization is constructed and managed.
Furthermore, regulation of different communication and media areas cannot just be joined
together organizationally, expecting synergies to develop from the mere organizational
unification process. It must be clearly determined how the different functions relate to one
another. A type of matrix structure may be necessary as a possible solution for reaping the
‘scope advantages’ and for avoiding the development of a disjunctive organization.
Regulations of communication and media areas may have many different forms, both in terms
of the scope of regulation, i.e. the different kinds of communication and media areas included,
and the depth or degree of regulation, meaning how strongly regulated an area is. If taking
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telecommunications as the point of departure, telecom may be regulated in the following
different settings:
· Light specific telecom regulation, first and foremost regulation of scarce resources
such as frequencies, rights of way, and names and numbers.
· Stronger specific telecom regulation, also encompassing interconnection and
universal service/access regulation.
· Convergence regulation, encompassing telecom, IT and broadcasting.
· Multi-sector regulation, where telecom is joined together with other infrastructural
utilities such as electricity, gas and railroads.
· Competition regulation of a broad range of different industries, where telecom is only
a tiny fraction.
In this list of regulatory settings, the scope of regulated areas expands from the first
mentioned to the last. However, there is also another dimension of categorization, namely the
depth or degree of regulation. When crossing these two dimensions, scope and degree,
different kinds of regulatory settings can be illustrated graphically, as in Figure 6.
The Multisectoral Utility Perspective: Bases of Multisector Regulation
The multisectoral utility perspective is based upon different priorities, assumptions and
conditions than the ICT convergence perspectives. In common usage, multisector regulation
is understood to be the functioning of a single regulatory agency that has responsibility for
sectors such as telecom, energy, water and transportation.  The classic multi-sector
regulatory agencies are the State Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) in the United States.
What is common in the objects of regulation, such as transport, telecom and energy, is the
monopoly associated with essential rights of way. Common use of rights of way by different
infrastructure sectors such as ICTs, energy, water and sewage is perhaps a justification for
multi-sector regulation. Rights of way are scarce and many countries are bound to allocate
them fairly because of their WTO commitments, among other things.  If indeed there is
substantial common use of conduits and rights of way, and those common elements
constitute a major portion of the supply chain, one might argue that the multi-sectors have
converged, and that what exists in fact is a sector – an infrastructure sector.
Common Assets: Rights of Way
Rights of way are a key asset for those who hold them, and access to them is essential for
new entrants. Historically granted at minimal cost to encourage infrastructure development,
they are becoming increasingly expensive and time consuming to acquire as more and more
players vie for them.13 In the US, for example, rights of way permits can account for 20% of
the cost of a fibre build, and can take over a year to acquire.14 And, of course, discriminatory
access to rights of way is a barrier to market entry. Thus, in conjunction with legislation
targeted at levelling infrastructure playing fields,15 there are also incentives for achieving
viable technological solutions, in particular for last mile distribution to the end-user.
The recently heightened importance of rights of way and conduit sharing (including power line
telecom, which is perhaps the ultimate expression of common use) is a subject of legitimate
interest to regulators, not only in telecom but also in other sectors.  The question of whether
rights of way and conduits constitute inputs so important that one must consider the possibility
that the hitherto distinct sectors are in the process of converging is one that is currently under
discussion.16
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One must, however exercise caution with the argument that common use of inputs or
economies of scope on the production side justify common regulation. As commentators on
the subject have pointed out,17 the fact that SIM cards of GSM mobile terminals are being
upgraded to function simultaneously as credit or debit cards does not necessarily justify a
single regulatory authority for telecom and financial services.
The regulatory issues that are posed by these forms of common and joint uses of rights of
way and conduits, include the prevention of anti-competitive behaviour (e.g., cross-subsidy)
by firms with significant market power in their “home” markets and ensuring non-
discriminatory access by new entrants to rights of way and conduits as well as consumer-
protection issues such as energy disconnections caused by failures to pay telephone bills.
These issues do not, by themselves, constitute a case for multi-sector regulation. However,
they do make a strong case for increased cooperation and coordination among infrastructure
regulators.
The rationales for participation by energy utility companies in telecom are varied. The primary
reasons given for penetrating telecom markets range from the need to improve operational
efficiencies to the overall strategic objectives of the company. It is generally assumed that
improved efficiencies include economies of scale and scope, eliminating redundant or
overlapping activities, efficiencies in procurement, production, marketing, and administration.
Strategic objectives include remaining competitive in a rapidly changing environment, building
core competencies, acquiring additional managerial and technical expertise, etc. When
energy utility executives were questioned on the actual reasons for entering into the telecom
market, however, the three reasons provided were “sharing of infrastructure, bundling of
opportunities and gaining experienced people.”18
Regulatory practice has long rested on ring-fencing specific regulated activities and the
associated costs and revenues. Holding company legislation and requirements for separate
subsidiaries and accounting separation have been among the regulatory instruments used to
ensure the proper application of regulatory rules and the prevention of undue cross subsidy.19
The contemporary efforts of utilities, in particular energy operators, to cross industry
boundaries therefore pose a problem for regulators. Both obvious responses are unattractive.
The conventional response of insisting upon separate subsidiaries is likely to generate
criticism on the ground that regulatory convenience is preventing innovation and the
realization of economies of scope. The other alternative of following the regulated company
could create jurisdictional overlap, unless a multi-sector regulatory agency is created.
Resources and Skills
The basic argument is that regulatory skills and the money needed to obtain the skills are in
short supply in developing countries (and were possibly in short supply in the US states
where multi-sector regulation first emerged in the 20th century).  In light of this scarcity of
regulatory resources, Schwartz and Satola see the necessity for multi-sector regulatory
agencies.  Multi-sector regulation may also prove useful for developed country governments
seeking to economize on regulatory resources.
The market for regulatory skills is no different from other markets; the price is set by the
interaction of supply and demand. Given the explosion of regulatory activities across the
world in the last decade of the 20th century, it is reasonable to expect that
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¨  Persons with the necessary regulatory skills are in short supply worldwide, the
educational system not having geared up for increased production in the short term; and
¨  The prices for the persons with skills have been bid up by increased demand.
They have sought to purchase these skills at local market rates rather than at international
rates. When the market for regulatory skills is conceptualised as a series of insulated national
markets, the mismatch between supply and demand becomes exacerbated, especially in
developing countries where the educational systems are slower to respond and human
resources  are shallower than in developed countries.
Liberalized infrastructure markets can result in dramatically higher levels of investments and
can generate enormous amounts of revenues both for the investors and for the governments.
It could be argued that a small proportion of the investments and/or revenues can be set apart
for regulatory outlays, which are after all what makes the investment feasible, without
burdening the general treasury funds. The favoured method of funding regulatory agencies
worldwide, a levy on operator revenues and/or license fees, reflects this thinking. If this
method of funding is adopted, the regulatory agency will have the resources to purchase the
necessary skills, through direct recruitment, training combined with adequate salaries, and
short-term outsourcing.
While many regulatory agencies have the revenues, there are barriers to spending the funds
as described above. Most governments constrain the levels of government salaries with the
good intentions of reducing expenditures on unproductive sectors of the economy and
preventing inflationary wage spirals. Regulatory agencies being seen as part of government,
the wages they can offer are also constrained. Except in the West European core and North
America, procedures intended to prevent corruption as well as the generally archaic systems
of public administration hinder the use of outsourcing. In most developing countries,
outsourcing is possible only in cases where multilateral or bilateral technical assistance funds
are available.
In sum, the scarcity of regulatory resources in developing countries is real, but it can be
caused by government procedures and policies that prevent relatively straight forward
market-based solutions from being applied. In the absence of a short-term solution to the
problem of ineffective government, designers of regulatory instruments for developing
countries must take scarcity of regulatory resources as a given.
Assessing Experience
Examination of the actual organization of US state–level multi-sector regulatory agencies, the
Public Utility Commissions (PUCs), does not provide much evidence of economies of
regulation, except at the level of the decision-makers, or Commissioners. Generally, staff
members specialize in a particular sector such as telecom or water and work within distinct
divisions that are devoted to sector-specific regulation. Resources are shared at the levels of
commissioners, who hear cases pertaining to all sectors, the senior staff who manage the
agency as a whole, and the legal staff responsible for hearings and related procedural
matters. Generally, the different divisions are located in common facilities and use common
amenities such as libraries which may yield certain savings. It must also be noted that US
PUCs do not have jurisdiction over frequency management, broadcasting, and cable. The
former two areas are subject to federal jurisdiction, while municipal governments and the
federal government share jurisdiction over cable.
The US PUC experience shows that there may be significant economies in areas such as use
of buildings, libraries, and training facilities in common. The Atkins report cited above
suggests that the UK regulatory agencies at least could use some new ideas in terms of
saving on these types of non-regulatory costs. This does not, however, justify multi-sector
regulation as such, only close collaboration and facility and service sharing among sectoral
regulatory agencies.
Despite these qualifications, the multi-sector solution should not be rejected out of hand.
Informed by the debate, it may be possible to devise innovative solutions such as keeping the
regulatory staff separate but sharing decision-making bodies; co-locating sector regulatory
agencies and allowing and encouraging mutual learning and resource sharing; and creating a
new category of regulatory organizations within government that would be subject to the most
advanced forms of administrative controls and managerial incentives.
One of the main advantages of multi-sector regulation, according to Schwartz and Satola
(2000), is the shield it provides against capture, both by industry and by political forces. The
argument is that a multi-sector regulatory agency is more likely to be independent and,
therefore, give greater certainty to investors through good governance.
Experience has shown that there are two major threats to the independence of sectoral
regulatory agencies from the government side. One is the line ministry, which previously
combined the functions of policy setting, regulation and operation, but following liberalization
has been left with only the task of policy setting, if anything. 20 The second is the ministry of
finance or equivalent, which is engaged in the privatisation of the incumbent operator or is the
major shareholder of the partially privatised incumbent.21 The multi-sector solution, by
definition, takes the regulatory agency out of the control of one line ministry (because there
will be more than one) and will give it a reporting relationship to either a ministry devoted to
economic reforms of the overall subject of finance, or the president, or prime minister, or the
legislature. An alternative solution to the problem of line ministries is to abolish them
altogether, as Senegal has done. 22 Japan, which has yet to create a separate regulatory
agency, has replaced the well known Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications with a new
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications.23 Following
liberalization, it is difficult to see the rationale for maintaining an entire ministry for policy
setting in a single field like telecom. The Japanese reorganization suggests that a ministry is
not justified, even where the regulatory function is retained.
However, the solution to the line ministry problem should not aggravate the finance ministry
problem. Unless proper safeguards are set in place, the multi-sector regulatory agency may
be interfered with by other parts of government with vested interests in multiple incumbent
infrastructure suppliers.
Multisector Agency Potential
The decision to create a multi-sector agency improves the chances of creating a modern,
competition-oriented agency that will not be beholden to incumbent operators. The possibility
that the regulatory agency will be staffed more or less completely by people who have spent
their entire careers in incumbent operators is a very real one, in the case of industry
regulators. With a multi-sector agency there is no direct path from incumbent to regulatory
agency. While some staff may be recruited from an incumbent, they will at least be balanced
by staff from another incumbent. Hopefully, the new organization will recruit economists,
lawyers and other professionals from the private sector who are not impaired by government
monopoly mindsets and who will be capable of balancing the recruits from the restructured
incumbents in the various industries. The key to this will of course be the early decisions
taken on organizational structure. If an industry-based structure is adopted, not only will it be
more likely that government-monopoly thinking will predominate, but also the desired
economies of regulation will not be achieved. If a skills-based organization with
interdisciplinary teams being constituted for various regulatory tasks can be established, it is
                                                                
20 See for example the continuing struggle between the Moroccan telecom regulatory agency, ANRT, which has
been recognized as one of the exemplary regulatory agencies in the world and the Ministry, SEPTI.  Bouzerda, Ali.
Head of Morocco telecoms watchdog resigns.  Totaltele.com. 11 Jan 2002.
http://www.totaltele.com/view.asp?ArticleID=47597&Pub=TT&CategoryID=627; and Bouzerda, Ali, Moroccan
regulator signals resignation, Totaltele.com.  O3 December 2001.
http://www.totaltele.com/view.asp?ArticleID=46417&Pub=TT&CategoryID=627
21 See for example, the tensions in Sri Lanka between the Public Enterprise Reform Commission of the Ministry of
Finance and the Telecom Regulatory Commission after the partial privatization of the incumbent in 1997. Samarajiva,
Rohan.  The role of competition in institutional reform of telecommunications: Lessons from Sri Lanka,
Telecommunications Policy, 24(8/9), 2000: 699-717.  At:  http://www.tpeditor.com/contents/2000/24-8+9.htm
22 Pan African News Agency (May 24, 2001).  “Workers in Communication Ministry ill at ease.”  At:
http://allafrica.com/stories/200105140793.html
23 http://www.soumu.go.jp/english/index.htm
more likely that an investor and customer friendly organization which enjoys economies of
regulation will emerge.
Overall Assessment
This paper is based on the assumption that sector-specific ex-ante regulation of telecom and
infrastructure utilities is necessary for the development of these industries, including broad
public access. This does not mean that convergence and efficient development of
infrastructure utilities will not be seen in countries that mostly rely on general competition
regulation and other sets of general regulation.  But it means that there generally are societal
benefits to be gained by establishing a regulatory foundation for the development of these
industries because of a broad range of market failures and the high degree of public interest
to which they are subject.24
The point of departure is, therefore, that sector-specific ex-ante regulation is potentially
beneficial. The open questions are how to combine them, on the one hand, in the ICT and
media area (convergence), and across utilities (multi-sector regulation).
The paper deals with both ICT and media convergence regulation and multi-sector utility
regulation, but does not preclude the possibility that both directions can be taken at the same
time. Is it an ‘and’ or an ‘or’? In principle, they are not mutually exclusive; however, in practice
it may be difficult to combine multi-sector infrastructure regulation with regulation of both
infrastructure and content. However, close examination of the North American practice of
convergence and multi-sector regulation would suggest that it may be feasible to structure a
regulatory agency that is converged at the top, but organized in separate divisions that
correspond to the current separate regulatory agencies in Europe and elsewhere.
The focus generally, and in this paper too, in the ICT and media convergence area is on the
object (substance) of regulation, i.e. the extent to which regulation of different areas should be
combined, taking technical and market-based convergence developments into consideration.
With respect to multi-sector regulation, the focus is mostly on the organizational aspect. In the
former, the subject matter is convergence regulation; in the latter, it is regulatory
convergence.
Even though the substance and the organizational aspects of regulation are not necessarily
directly related – it is possible to regulate closely interrelated subjects in separate institutions
just as well as it is possible to regulate relatively separate issues in crosscutting institutions –
combinations of institutions are most often built upon combined issues. This also applies to
multi-sector regulation. As documented in the paper, different kinds of utilities can make use
of the same conduits, and mergers and acquisitions may also occur across sector
boundaries. Thus it could be argued that a common basis exists for regulatory coordination, if
not for joint regulatory organizations.
However, the main arguments for multi-sector regulatory organizations deal with institutional
questions of resource allocation and independence from undue government interference. The
first point taken up is the costs of obtaining the requisite expertise. There are two sides to this.
The first is the existence of adequate expertise in a national labour market. The second is
whether regulatory institutions can afford to, or are allowed to, hire existing experts. The
problem is found in all countries, but is exacerbated in developing countries. Multi-sector
regulatory agencies may, under certain conditions, allow for a least-worst solution for
regulation using a limited pool of qualified persons. If not a fully-fledged multi-sector
regulatory agency, some aspects of a multi-sector organizational structure may assist
European regulatory agencies combat administrative bloat.
The second point relates to the potential of multi-sector regulatory agencies to allow for a
greater degree of independence from line ministries, again a question that is of obvious
importance in developing countries, but not irrelevant in European countries, particularly
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those that have not yet let go of their incumbents. But the analysis contains a caution about
the solution sometimes being worse than the original problem, in terms of making the
regulatory agency vulnerable to the improper influence of finance ministries.
Third, the multi-sector option has the potential of preventing the wholesale transfer of
government-monopoly mindsets through the staffing of the new agency by persons from the
restructured incumbents. There is no guarantee that this outcome will be achieved, but a
multi-sector agency organized on the basis of skills and interdisciplinary teams constituted for
specific tasks is more likely to break free of incumbent mindsets than an industry regulatory
agency.
Conclusion
With respect to ICT and media convergence, the main questions in the paper are to what
extent different communication infrastructures can be regulated in the same manner and to
what extent infrastructure and content can be regulated by one common set of regulations.
The general trend around the world is to move towards common infrastructure regulation
encompassing formerly more separate infrastructures, e.g. fixed telecom, mobile
communications, cable and possibly terrestrial broadcasting. However, there are also some
inchoate tendencies towards institutions with responsibility for joint infrastructure and content
regulation.
The paper does not provide definite answers to these questions but seeks to raise the policy
and regulatory issues of ICT and media convergence as precisely as possible. Indeed, the
answers will be different in different countries. There is no one formula that can be used in all
countries. Yet, countries will have to approach the issues of ICT and media convergence in a
forward looking manner not only for determining new rules for interconnection, universal
access and access to scarce resources, but also for building a regulatory framework for
increasing the growth potentials in a networked economy.
ICT and media convergence issues are primarily about improving the efficiency of market
economies, and how changes in regulation can facilitate this process. It is likely to be of
primary interest for countries that already have an established effective independent telecom
regulator. Multisector regulation issues are primarily about establishing the efficiency and
effectiveness  of regulation so it can be a catalyst for network and economic development. It
is likely to be of primary interest to countries that have not yet established effective telecom
regulation. Each regulatory option arises from an initial diagnose of different problems, and
represents different priorities and pathways to achieving a very similar set of development
objectives.
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